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COMPETITION
PACE LAW SCHOOL
2014 Bench Memorandum

I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. PARTIES
Jacques Bonhomme (Bonhomme), a foreign national and
president and member of the board of directors of a mining
company (Precious Minerals International or PMI), owns
property in the State of Progress that contains the terminus of
Ditch C-1 where it discharges through a culvert into Reedy
Creek. Bonhomme was a plaintiff in his action against Maleau
and a defendant in the action brought by the State of Progress.
On appeal he is an appellant and a cross-appellee.
Shifty Maleau (Maleau), a mine operator, created piles of
mining waste (overburden and slag) on his property that
allegedly discharge waste, including arsenic, into Ditch C-1,
which then flows through Bonhomme’s property where it
discharges into Reedy Creek. Maleau was a defendant in
Bonhomme’s action against him and an intervenor-plaintiff in
Progress’s action against Bonhomme. He is an appellant and
cross-appellee on appeal.
The State of Progress (Progress) contains a portion of
Reedy Creek and its terminus in Wildman Marsh, which is solely
contained within Progress, and both Bonhomme and Maleau’s
properties. The rest of Reedy Creek is contained in the State of
New Union. Progress was a plaintiff in its action against
Bonhomme and is an appellant and cross-appellee on appeal.
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B. APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW








U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Fed. R. Civ. P. (17)(a).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) § 101, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012).
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013).

C. SUMMARY OF FACTS
The undisputed facts established in the court below are as
follows:
Reedy Creek begins in the State of New Union and flows 50
miles, eventually entering Progress and flowing into Wildman
Marsh. Reedy Creek is used as the water supply for Bounty
Plaza, a service area in New Union on a federally-funded
interstate highway and as irrigation in both states for
agricultural products that are sold in interstate commerce. Reedy
Creek is not used and has never been used for waterborne
transportation, and could not be so used with reasonable
improvements. Wildman Marsh, wholly located in Progress and
mostly contained in Wildman National Wildlife Refuge, is an
extensive wetlands and an essential stopover for migratory
waterfowl. Hunters from around the nation are drawn to the
Marsh and add over $25 million to the local economy.
Bonhomme, a foreign national and the President and a
member of the board of directors and largest shareholder of
Precious Metals International (PMI), owns property in Progress
that fronts the Marsh. He used the hunting lodge on the property
up to eight times a year for hunting parties primarily consisting
of business clients and associates of PMI; however, his use of the
lodge has decreased in recent years to two times a year. The
parties dispute the cause of his decreased use – Bonhomme
asserts that it is due to his fear of the arsenic in the Marsh, while
Maleau and Progress assert it is due to PMI’s decline during the
recent recession.
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Ditch C-1 is a drainage ditch that contains running water
except during annual periods of drought lasting from several
weeks to three months. One average, it is three feet wide and one
foot deep. The Ditch first flows through Maleau’s property in
Jefferson County and then continues through several agricultural
properties before it runs through Bonhomme’s property where it
empties into Reedy Creek via a culvert.
Maleau operates a gold mine in Lincoln County, Progress
along the Buena Vista River, but trucks the overburden and slag
to his property in Jefferson County, Progress. Maleau places the
piles of mining waste adjacent to Ditch C-1. When it rains, the
rainwater percolates through the piles, eroding channels from the
piles leading to Ditch C-1. These gravity-eroded channels carry
arsenic and rainwater from the piles into Ditch C-1, which in turn
carries the arsenic to Reedy Creek.
Upstream of Maleau’s property, arsenic is undetectable in
Ditch C-1; however, downstream of his property, arsenic is
present in high levels. Additionally, in Reedy Creek, arsenic is
undetectable upstream of Ditch C-1, but is present downstream of
Ditch C-1 and in Wildman Marsh. Moreover, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service has detected arsenic in three Blue-winged Teal
ducks in Wildman Marsh.
Bonhomme sued Maleau under the citizen suit provision of
the CWA for Maleau’s arsenic discharges into Ditch C-1 and
Reedy Creek in violation of § 301(a). After proper notice,
Progress filed a citizen suit against Bonhomme alleging that he
was in violation of CWA § 301(a) by discharging arsenic from his
culvert into Reedy Creek. Maleau intervened in Progress’s action
against Bonhomme as a matter of right under § 505(b)(1)(B). The
cases were consolidated because the facts and law are the same.
The defendant in each suit filed motions to dismiss.
On July 23, 2012, the district court granted Progress’s and
Maleau’s motion to dismiss and denied Bonhomme’s motion to
dismiss, holding that (1) Bonhomme is not a real party in interest
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 17(a); (2)
Bonhomme is not a citizen as defined in CWA §§ 505(g) and
502(5); (3) Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources; (4) Ditch C1 is not a jurisdictional water of the United States; (5) Reedy
Creek is a jurisdictional water of the United States; and (6)
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Bonhomme violates the CWA by adding arsenic to Reedy Creek
through a culvert on his property regardless of whether Maleau is
the but-for cause of the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1.
II. ISSUES
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on
appeal:
 Whether Bonhomme is the real party in interest
under FRCP 17 to bring a suit against Maleau for
violating § 301(a) of the CWA.
o Maleau and Progress argue that PMI, not
Bonhomme, is the real party in interest.
o Bonhomme argues that he is the real party in
interest.
 Whether Bonhomme—a foreign national—is a
“citizen” under CWA § 505 who may bring suit
against Maleau.
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that
Bonhomme is not a “citizen” under CWA § 505 and
thus may not bring suit against Maleau.
o Bonhomme argues that he is a “citizen” under CWA
§ 505 and thus may bring a suit against Maleau.
 Whether Maleau’s mining waste piles are “point
sources” under CWA § 502(12) & (14).
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that
Maleau’s mining waste piles are not point sources.
o Bonhomme argues that Maleau’s waste piles are
point sources.
 Whether Ditch C-1 is a water of the United States
under CWA § 502(7) & (12).
o On appeal, Bonhomme and Progress argue that
Ditch C-1 is a water of the United States.
o Maleau argues that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the
United States.
 Whether Reedy Creek is a water of the United
States under CWA § 502(7) & (12).
o On appeal, Bonhomme and Progress argue that
Reedy Creek is a water of the United States.
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Maleau argues that Reedy Creek is not a water of
the United States.
 Whether Bonhomme violates CWA § 301(a) by
adding arsenic to Reedy Creek through a culvert on
his property even if Maleau is the but-for cause of
the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1.
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that
Bonhomme is in violation of CWA § 301(a) because
Bonhomme is the owner of the culvert discharging
into Reedy Creek.
o Bonhomme argues that Maleau is in violation of
CWA § 301(a) because Maleau is the but-for cause
of the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1.
[See pages 22-23 for tables showing the parties’ procedural
postures and general arguments by issue.]
o

III. FRCP 17(A)—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT BONHOMME WAS NOT THE
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BRING SUIT
AGAINST MALEAU FOR VIOLATING § 301 OF
THE CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311?
Bonhomme argues that he is the real party in interest
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 17(a) and that the
court below erred in granting Progress’ and Maleau’s motion to
dismiss on this issue. Maleau and Progress argue that
Precious Metals International (PMI) is the real party in interest
under FRCP 17(a) and that the court below did not err in
granting their motion to dismiss on this issue.
Under FRCP 17(a), “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (17)(a). The
purpose of this requirement is to direct the court’s “attention to
whether the plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular
action he has instituted.” 6 CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1542 (3d
ed. 1998). The plaintiff has a significant interest in an action
when he holds a substantive right to be enforced. See Farrell
Const. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, La., 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir.
1990). To determine Bonhomme’s substantive rights, the parties
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must look to CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, which states that “any
person or persons having an interest which is or may be affected”
may bring an action on his behalf. See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra, § 1544, at 639 (stating that where federal statutes create a
substantive right of action, the issue of whether the plaintiff is a
real party in interest must be resolved by looking to federal law).
Bonhomme will argue that although he is associated with
PMI, he is still the real party in interest in this action as he has
“an interest which . . . is affected.” Bonhomme should recognize
that his property has ties with PMI, but he should emphasize the
economic ramifications on his ownership and use of his property
in addition to his environmental interest in using the Marsh to
hunt. See 118 CONG. REC. 33,699-700 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Edmund Muskie) (Congress intended that a proper interest under
CWA § 505 can be economic, aesthetic, or environmental).
Bonhomme owns a hunting lodge that fronts Wildman
Marsh, which he contends has been negatively affected by the
discharge of arsenic. While Bonhomme does not reside at the
hunting lodge, he is the owner of the property and had used the
lodge up to eight times a year when the Marsh was not
contaminated with arsenic. Bonhomme further alleges that the
wildlife, including ducks, are being harmed by the arsenic, and
thus he has decreased the use of his hunting lodge to only twice a
year. Bonhomme will maintain that because the arsenic has
negatively affected his use of his property and Wildman Marsh,
he is a “person[] having an interest which is . . . affected,” and
thus holds a substantive right to be enforced under the CWA as
the real party in interest.
Moreover, Bonhomme may argue that he is the real party in
interest regardless of whether PMI may benefit from the
prosecution of this action. Reichhold Chemical Inc. v. Travelers
Insurance Co. held that the plaintiff need not be the ultimate
economic beneficiary of the action in order to be the real party in
interest. Bonhomme can thus argue that he is the real party in
interest even if PMI may ultimately reap economic benefits from
the action. 544 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Conversely, Maleau and Progress will argue that PMI is
the real party in interest in this action. Bonhomme is the
president and a 3% shareholder of PMI in addition to being on its
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board of directors. Bonhomme’s hunting lodge is used sparingly
and primarily for hunting parties comprised of business
associates of PMI. Moreover, Maleau alleges that any decrease in
use of the lodge is more likely to be a reflection of the economic
health of PMI than the effect of any alleged arsenic discharges.
Maleau and Progress can also argue that Bonhomme has
nothing to gain or lose from the prosecution of the action and thus
is not a real party in interest. Buhonick v. Am. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 190 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Penn. 1960). Since PMI is
paying attorney fees and court costs, Bonhomme will not suffer
negative economic consequences should he lose nor will he be
entitled to attorney’s fees under CWA § 505(d) should he win.
However, Bonhomme may respond that he stands to gain or lose
noneconomic interests in the improvement or continued pollution
of the Marsh.
While Maleau and Progress will argue that the fact that PMI
is paying for attorney’s fees, witness fees, and paid for water
testing demonstrates that PMI is the real party in interest,
Bonhomme will respond that these facts are irrelevant to the
real party in interest analysis. See Rackley v. Bd. of Trs. of
Orangeburg Reg’l Hosp., 35 F.R.D. 516, 518 (E.D.S.C. 1964)
(holding that inquiries concerning who was paying for plaintiffs’
attorney’s fees were irrelevant to FRCP 17(a) analysis).
A. STANDING
Although the concepts of Article III standing and the
plaintiff’s status as a real party in interest are distinct
considerations, the inquiries may still be intertwined. Some
courts have recognized the interconnected relationship between
the two concepts and have held that once a plaintiff has been
found to have standing, any further litigation of his status as a
real party in interest is foreclosed. Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d
351, 353 (7th Cir. 1975). In this case, the issue of standing was
not litigated before the lower court; however, standing may be
raised at any point in the litigation. Nat’l Org. for Women v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994). Bonhomme could therefore
argue that he meets the standing requirements to bring a suit
under the CWA, and therefore he must also be the real party in
interest.
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Generally, in order for a plaintiff to have Article III standing,
he must show that (1) he has suffered a “concrete and particular”
injury which is “actual or imminent;” (2) “the injury is fairly . . .
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and (3) it is
likely “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
Bonhomme can argue that he has suffered an injury by citing to
his fear of using and his decreased use of the Marsh for duck
hunting. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that
they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic
and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the
challenged activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since
Bonhomme has used the Marsh in the past and will not continue
to use it to the same extent due to its pollution, he has alleged an
injury in fact. Additionally, the water tests suggest that the
arsenic in the Creek and the Marsh originate from Maleau’s
waste piles, demonstrating that the injury is fairly traceable to
Maleau’s alleged discharges and that Maleau’s cessation of
discharging would redress his injury.
Alternatively, Maleau and Progress will argue that it is
not settled law that a plaintiff’s Article III standing automatically
gives him status as the real party in interest. Gonzalez ex rel.
Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing 4
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 17.1
0[1] (3d ed. 1997)). Maleau and Progress may go on to argue that
Bonhomme does not have Article III standing, however this
argument is weak.1

1. If a party makes an argument against Bonhomme’s Article III standing,
make sure that they are attacking an element of the Article III standing based
on evidence in the record and not speculation.
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IV. CWA § 505—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN
DETERMINING THAT BONHOMME, A
FOREIGN NATIONAL, IS NOT A “CITIZEN”
UNDER CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, AND THUS
CANNOT MAINTAIN A SUIT AGAINST
MALEAU?
Bonhomme argues that despite being a foreign national, he
is nonetheless a “citizen” as defined in CWA §§ 505(g) and 502(5),
33 U.S.C. §§1365(g) and 1362(5). Maleau and Progress argue
that as a foreign national, Bonhomme cannot be a “citizen” as
defined by CWA §§ 505(g) and 502(5).
CWA § 505(a) provides that “any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . who is
alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation . . .
.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). Citizen is then further defined in CWA §
502(5) for the purposes of § 505 as “a person . . . having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C. §
1365(g). Person is then defined as “an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(5). There is virtually no case law to support either
Bonhomme’s or Maleau and Progress’s positions. Thus, the
parties’ arguments will be based on (perhaps creative) statutory
interpretation.
Bonhomme’s strongest argument is that although the word
citizen is used in CWA § 505(a), Congress was silent as to the
requirement of United States citizenship. Further, Congress’s
silence on the matter does not create a “clear and manifest
purpose” to exempt foreign nationals from commencing a citizen
suit under CWA § 505. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002) (stating that Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s (FIFRA’s) silence as
to whether local governments could regulate the sale of pesticides
“cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to preempt local authority . . .” under that statute.). Congress had the
opportunity to include a U.S. citizenship requirement in the
definition of citizen in CWA § 505(g), but did not do so.
Bonhomme will argue that this silence on the matter cannot
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disqualify a foreign national from bringing suit under the CWA’s
citizen suit provision.
Moreover, Bonhomme may assert that reading “citizen” so
as to require United States citizenship frustrates the purpose of
CWA § 505. Section 505 was intended to allow the public to
supplement administrative response to water pollution. See Com.
of Mass. v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); S.
REP. NO. 92-414, 3745-46 (1972). The additional requirement of
United States citizenship would further restrict public
participation and negatively affect the efficacy of the citizen suit
provision.
Alternatively, Progress’ and Maleau’s strongest argument
is for a plain reading of the word citizen. The Supreme Court has
stated “the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms.” Cent. Trust Co. v. Official Creditor’s Comm. of
Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982) (citing Caminetti
v. United States., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). The common
meaning of citizen is “[a] person who legally belongs to a country
and has the rights and protection of that country.” Citizen,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/citizen (last visited Dec. 2, 2013); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (9th ed. 2009) (defining citizen as
“[a] person who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of
a political community, owing allegiance to the community and
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections; a
member of the civil state, entitled to all its privileges.”). Thus,
they will argue that the plain meaning of CWA § 505(a) prohibits
the commencement of a suit by a foreign national such as
Bonhomme.
However, Bonhomme may argue that the Supreme Court
has already rejected the argument that the plain meaning of
“citizen” prohibits the commencement of a citizen suit by a person
or entity that is not a citizen as defined in the dictionary. In
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
held that the State of Ohio was a “citizen” under CWA § 505(a)
and was thus entitled to maintain its suit against the
Department of Energy. 503 U.S. 607, 616 (1992). Moreover,
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courts have consistently allowed nonprofit corporations to bring
citizen suits without questioning their status as a “citizen” under
the CWA. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. Both
states and corporations are not citizens under the plain meaning
of the word, but have nevertheless been allowed to maintain
citizen suits as “citizens” under the CWA. Thus, Bonhomme may
argue that such a stringent reading of the statute is
unwarranted.
Maleau and Progress will argue that the use of “person” in
§ 502(5) of the CWA to define citizen does not deprive the word
“citizen” of all meaning. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held
that Congress’s use of “waters of the United States” in defining
the narrower concept of “navigable waters” did not deprive the
word navigable of all meaning. 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
Similarly, Congress’s use of the broader term “person” in defining
“citizen” cannot deprive the word citizen of all meaning.
Therefore, Bonhomme must be a citizen in addition to a person in
order to bring a suit under the CWA.
Further, Maleau and Progress will argue that such a plain
reading of the CWA does not frustrate the purpose of the CWA or
create an absurd result. There is no indication that Congress, by
using the word “citizen,” had any other intent than to make
United States citizenship a prerequisite to the commencement of
a citizen suit.
V. POINT SOURCES—DID THE LOWER COURT
ERR IN HOLDING THAT MALEAU’S MINING
WASTE PILES ARE NOT POINT SOURCES?
Bonhomme contends that Maleau’s mining waste piles are
point sources under CWA §§ 502(12) & (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12)
& (14). However, Maleau and Progress respond that Maleau’s
mining waste piles are not point sources under CWA §§ 502(12) &
(14).
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the “discharge of any
pollutant by any person” except in compliance with CWA permits.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Under CWA § 502(12), the discharge of a
pollutant is defined as the addition of a pollutant from a point
source to a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Furthermore,
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CWA § 502(14) defines a point source as “any discernible,
confined, and discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Conversely, the CWA does not prohibit the addition of a pollutant
from nonpoint sources. Therefore, whether Maleau’s waste piles
are point sources is crucial to the question of whether Maleau has
violated the CWA.
Although § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), lists potential point
sources as “any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, [or]
discrete fissure . . . [,]” courts generally define the term broadly
while still “exclud[ing] unchanneled and uncollected surface
waters.” Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373
(4th Cir. 1976). Courts in the Second and Fourth Circuits have
already addressed the issue of whether mining waste is a point
source and these cases provide arguments for the parties to
present.
Bonhomme’s strongest argument in asserting that Maleau’s
mining waste piles are a point source is based on the court’s
holding in Sierra Club v. Abston Cons. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1980). In Abston, the defendant coal mining company, while
engaging in strip mining, created highly erodible piles of
overburden and built sediment basins to catch any discharges
from the piles. However, during periods of heavy rain, pollutants
were discharged into the creek from both overflow from the
sediment basin and erosion-created ditches and gullies leading to
the stream from the spoil piles.
In addressing whether the spoil piles fell under the definition
of point source, the Fifth Circuit noted that the “ultimate
question is whether pollutants were discharged from discernible,
confined, and discrete conveyance(s)” and considered two
situations in which mining spoil piles could be considered a point
source. Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the first
situation, the court opined that a spoil pile may be a point source
where “[g]ravity flow, result[s] in a discharge into a navigable
body of water . . . if the miner at least initially collected or
channeled the water and other materials.” Id. In the second
situation, the court stated that a spoil pile may be a point source
“where miners design spoil piles from discarded overburden such
that, during periods of precipitation, erosion of spoil pile walls
results in discharges into a navigable body of water by means of
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ditches, gullies and similar conveyances, even if the miners have
done nothing beyond the mere collection of rock and other
materials.” Id.
Bonhomme will argue that Maleau’s waste piles clearly fall
under the second situation described in Abston and are thus
included in the definition of point source. Here, much like in
Abston, Maleau has created highly erodible piles of mining
overburden in close to proximity to a waterway. These piles have
predictably eroded and created a series of ditches and gullies
leading to Ditch C-1 where they discharge arsenic. Thus, under
Abston, it is enough that Maleau has “done nothing beyond the
mere collection of rock and other minerals.” Id. It is irrelevant
that the ditches and gullies have been created by gravity and
erosion and not by human intervention; these waste piles are a
point source since they are discharging pollutants through
“discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance(s).” Id.
Maleau and Progress will argue that his waste piles are
not point sources because they do not fall under either of the
scenarios described in Abston. First, they can argue that
although he has collected the waste materials, he has not
“initially collected the water” discharged from his waste piles. Id.
Thus, his waste piles do not fall under the first Abston scenario.
As for the second Abston scenario, they can argue that although
his spoil piles have eroded, creating ditches and gullies, they are
not discharging into a navigable water. In order for Maleau’s
waste piles to fit into the second situation described by the court,
the erosion from those piles would have to “discharge[] into a
navigable body of water.” Id. Since the court in Abston clearly
included a requirement that the erosion discharge into a
navigable water, Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources. Id.
(The navigability of Ditch C-1 is discussed infra at 16.)
However, Bonhomme may note that the non-navigability of
Ditch C-1 does not necessarily foreclose the Court finding that the
waste piles are point sources. Courts have held that discharges
into non-navigable conveyances leading to a navigable water are
still classified as discharges from a point source. See Sierra Club
v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a mine shaft was a point source where 2.5 miles of
tunnel separated shaft and navigable water); Concerned Area
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Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that a pipe discharging into a ditch which then
discharged into a navigable water was a point source).
Further, Maleau and Progress will argue that Abston
should not be applied because it is not established law as to
mining waste discharge, as the Fourth Circuit has also had the
opportunity to address the issue of discharges from mining waste
in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976)
and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.
1979), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Envtl. Prot. Agency v.
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). In Appalachian
Power, the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to EPA’s
regulation of the runoff from areas used for material storage.
While in Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit considered
challenges to EPA’s regulation of coal preparation areas. In both
cases, the court held that unchanneled water from materials
storage or coal preparation does not fall under the definition of
point source.
In Appalachian Power, the court remanded EPA’s rainfall
runoff regulations because the regulations were not confined to
point source pollution. 545 F.2d at 1372. In coming to this
conclusion, the court decided that the regulations, as written,
could apply to runoff that was neither channelized or collected
and held that “[the definition of point source] does not include
unchanneled and uncollected surface waters.” Id. Additionally,
the court recognized that runoff from storage areas was not
typically routed through a point source collection system,
indicating that those areas could not be point sources without a
collection system. Id.
In Consolidation Coal, the court upheld EPA’s regulations
regarding surface runoff at coal preparation plants. The relevant
portion of the challenged regulation applied to “discharges from
coal preparation plants and associated areas, including
discharges which are pumped, siphoned or drained from coal
storage.” 604 F.2d at 249. In upholding the regulations, the court
again noted that “unchanneled and uncollected surface waters”
are not included in the definition of point source and found that
the regulation excluded those nonpoint sources. Id.
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Maleau and Progress will argue that together Appalachian
Power and Consolidation Coal stand for the proposition that
waste piles are not point sources unless their runoff is channeled
and collected. They will argue that here, although there has been
erosion, there has been no channelization or collection by Maleau
of the runoff from the piles in any collection system. Thus under
the Fourth Circuit’s decisions, Maleau’s piles are not point
sources and the discharge is merely “unchanneled and
uncollected surface water[].”604 F.2d at 249.
Bonhomme will argue that although Appalachian Power
and Consolidation Coal may stand for the proposition that waste
piles are not point sources unless their runoff is channeled and
collected, the cases did not address the issue of channelization by
erosion and gravity and can still be read in conjunction with
Abston. This argument is supported by the fact that the Abston
court used both Appalachian Power and Consolidation Coal in
support of its decision. 620 F.2d at 45. Moreover, mining
discharges caused by rain fall, but traceable to a discrete source,
have been found to be point sources. See Trs. for Alaska v. Envt’l
Prot. Agency, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (“When mining
activities release pollutants from a discernable conveyance, they
are subject to NPDES regulation, as are all point sources.”);
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983,
988 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (reasoning that because discharges from
mining ponds and refuse piles are easily traceable to their source,
they are discharges from point sources even if the discharge was
caused by rain fall).
Bonhomme may also argue that Appalachian Power and
Consolidation Coal do not apply because they predate EPA’s
NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water
Discharges Rule, which requires a NPDES to discharge
contaminated storm water from a mining operation. 55 Fed. Reg.
47990, 48029 (Nov. 16, 1990) (not requiring NPDES permits for
discharges of storm water “that are not contaminated by contact
with any overburden, raw material, intermediate products,
finished product, by product or waste products . . . .”). Since the
discharges from Maleau’s piles are contaminated with overburden
and waste products, Maleau must obtain a NPDES permit for the
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discharges. Given that NPDES permits regulate point sources,
Bonhomme can argue that Maleau’s waste piles are point sources.
VI. NAVIGABILITY—DID THE LOWER COURT
ERR IN DETERMINING THAT REEDY CREEK
IS A NAVIGABLE WATER/WATER OF THE
UNITED STATES?
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters, defined as “waters of the United States, including
territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) & 1362(7). Therefore, the
navigability of both Ditch C-1 (discussed infra at 16) and Reedy
Creek are necessary elements in determining whether either
Maleau or Bonhomme is violating the CWA. Bonhomme and
Progress contend that Reedy Creek is a water of the United
States (or water of the U.S.). Maleau asserts that Reedy Creek
is not a water of the U.S.
In the context of the CWA, the Supreme Court has noted that
actual navigability, like that discussed in The Daniel Ball, 10
Wall. 557, 563 (1871) (holding that a river is navigable if it is
navigable in-fact, meaning that it is used or is susceptible of use
as a highway of commerce), is of “limited import.” United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the word
navigable cannot be devoid of all meaning in determining
whether waters are jurisdictional waters of the U.S. under the
CWA. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (commonly referred to as
SWANCC).
Bonhomme and Progress’s first and most obvious
argument is that Reedy Creek is a water of the U.S. because it is
an interstate water. EPA’s definition of waters of the U.S.
includes “[a]ll interstate waters.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Since Reedy
Creek begins in the State of New Union and ends in the State of
Progress, it is clearly an interstate water and thus falls under the
definition of waters of the U.S. The Fourth Circuit indicated that
the interstate nature of a water may be enough for classification
as a water of the U.S. when it stated that “the phrase navigable
waters refers to waters which, if not navigable in fact, are at least
interstate.” United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir.
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1997). Additionally, Bonhomme and Progress can bolster their
argument that Reedy Creek is a water of the U.S. due to its
interstate nature by citing the Supreme Court’s emphasis of the
intrastate nature of the ponds in SWANCC, which the Court held
were not waters of the U.S.; the parties might argue that the
SWANCC opinion indicates that the ponds may have been waters
of the U.S. if they were interstate. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
Maleau, however, may raise the point that the interstate
nature of Reedy Creek alone may not necessarily make it a water
of the U.S. He can argue that since Congress’s authority to
regulate waters of the U.S. rests on the Commerce Clause, the
fact that it is interstate is not sufficient for Congress’s regulation
under the Commerce Clause. See ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, No. 97–3090–CL, 2012 WL 3526833 at *12 (D.
Idaho 2012) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164,
174 (1979)).
In ONRC, the court held that the Klamath Straits Drain was
a water of the U.S. as it was interstate and substantially affected
interstate commerce. The court considered the drain as part of a
much larger watershed, including a river and a lake, which
helped provide irrigation for $120 million dollars’ worth of
agricultural products and hydroelectric power for parts of
California and Oregon. In comparison, Reedy Creek’s only uses
are as a water supply for a singular rest stop and irrigation for
agriculture along its 50-mile stretch. Maleau can argue that
because the interstate effects of Reedy Creek are significantly
smaller than that of the drain in ONRC, it is not clear that the
Creek has “an indisputable direct and significant impact on
interstate commerce.” Id. Thus, the Creek is not a water of the
U.S.
In response, Bonhomme and Progress may argue that
even if the interstate nature of the Creek is alone is not enough
for it to be classified as a water of the U.S., the Creek’s effects on
interstate commerce are similar to that of the Drain in ONRC.
Although the Creek’s agricultural use may be more limited than
that in ONRC, it is still used primarily for the irrigation of
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agricultural products sold in interstate commerce.2 Additionally,
the Creek affects Wildman Marsh, which draws hunters from
other states, adding $25 million to the local economy. Thus,
Bonhomme and Progress may contend that the Creek is a water
of the U.S. since it is interstate in nature and adequately affects
interstate commerce.
Maleau may point to SWANCC to support the proposition
that Reedy Creek’s use for irrigation does not make it a water of
the U.S. In SWANCC, the Supreme Court held that the
“Migratory Bird Rule,” which contained a provision including
intrastate waters used to irrigate crops sold in interstate
commerce in the definition of waters of the U.S., exceeded
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 531 U.S. at 174.
However, Bonhomme and Progress will point out that the
regulations in SWANCC were applicable to intrastate waters, so
it is unclear if they would be found to exceed the Commerce
Clause powers if applied to an interstate water such as Reedy
Creek.
Additionally, Bonhomme and Progress may argue that
Reedy Creek is a navigable water by relying upon United States
v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979). In Earth
Sciences, the Fourth Circuit held that a creek that supported
wildlife and provided water for irrigation for agriculture sold in
interstate commerce was a water of the U.S. because it affected
interstate commerce. Id. at 374. However, Maleau may call
Earth Science’s validity into doubt by pointing out that it
predates both Rapanos and SWANCC.
Bonhomme and Progress can argue that Reedy Creek still
falls within the definition of waters of the U.S. regardless of
whether it is an interstate water since it is a tributary of
Wildman Marsh, which is mostly contained within Wildman
National Wildlife Refuge.
Although EPA does not include
intrastate wetlands that are on Federal lands in their definition
2. An interesting (and creative) argument for Bonhomme to make is that
Reedy Creek’s use for irrigation makes the water in the creek a commodity of
interstate commerce, making federal jurisdiction under the CWA and the
Commerce Clause proper. Cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629
(1978) (holding that garbage, as an object of interstate trade, invoked the
dormant commerce clause).
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of waters of the U.S., 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, Bonhomme and Progress
can argue that the Marsh is a water of the U.S. as it falls within
the plain meaning of the phrase in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) because
Congress may regulate the waters on its lands through the
Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. Thus, since the
definition of waters of the U.S. include tributaries to those waters
and Reedy Creek is a tributary of Wildman Marsh, Reedy Creek
falls within that definition. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Maleau, on the
other hand, can point out that EPA’s definition of waters of the
U.S. includes no such interpretation that federal wetlands are
included in waters of the U.S. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Moreover, a
tributary is only considered a water of the U.S. if it is a tributary
to a water described in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Thus, Reedy Creek, as
a tributary, does not fall under EPA’s definition of waters of the
U.S.
VII. NAVIGABILITY—DID THE LOWER COURT
ERR IN HOLDING THAT DITCH C-1 IS NOT A
NAVIGABLE WATER/WATER OF THE UNITED
STATES?
Bonhomme and Progress argue that Ditch C-1 is a water
of the United States (or water of the U.S.), while Maleau
contends that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S. The main issue
in determining whether Ditch C-1 is a water of the U.S. is
whether the term water of the U.S. includes intermittent
channels that are tributaries to a water of the U.S. While
Rapanos ultimately dealt with the classification of wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters and tributaries, the Supreme Court
also discussed the issue of intermittently dry tributaries in that
case. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The
fragmented opinion created two tests for determining if a water is
a water of the U.S., the “relatively permanent waters” standard
as espoused by the plurality and the “significant nexus” standard
created by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. The question of which
test is controlling leaves room for both sides to make arguments
as to whether Ditch C-1’s is a water of the U.S.3 Rapanos, 547
3. Since Rapanos is a plurality opinion, there is debate as to the proper
application of the two tests. Some circuits have used only Justice Kennedy’s
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U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the lack of a
majority gives no precise limit on CWA’s jurisdiction).
A. THE “SIGNIFICANT NEXUS” TEST
Bonhomme and Progress may rely upon Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus test” in arguing that Ditch C-1, as a tributary
to a water of the U.S., is in turn a water of the U.S. In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy called into doubt the plurality’s
requirement that waters of the U.S. are necessarily permanent,
reasoning that a requirement that would allow federal
jurisdiction over a continuous trickle, but not a seasonal high
volume stream “makes little practical sense in a statute
concerned with downstream water quality.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Kennedy stated
that waters, whether or not they are intermittent, having a
significant nexus with a water that is navigable in fact are waters
of the U.S. Id. at 759. A significant nexus exists between two
bodies of water if there is evidence of a hydrological connection
demonstrating the “significance of the connection for downstream
water quality.” Id. at 784.
Bonhomme and Progress may assert that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion is controlling, citing the decisions of the
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and thus Ditch C-1 is a
water of the U.S. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464
F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
since Bonhomme and Progress may establish a relatively
permanent hydrological connection and an effect on the water
quality of the creek, they will argue that Ditch C-1 is a water of
the U.S.
“significant nexus” test, relying on Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)
(holding where there is a fragmented Supreme Court decision, the concurrence
on the narrowest ground may be considered to be the holding of the case).
However, other circuits have interpreted Marks differently or have not applied
Marks and found that a water is a jurisdictional water of the United States
using either test. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir.
2006) (holding that Justice Stevens’ dissent finding jurisdiction using either test
to be “controlling”).
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However, Maleau may call into question the applicability of
the “significant nexus” test to the facts of this case. First, Maleau
will point out Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test – requiring
that the water in question have a significant nexus with a
navigable-in-fact water – is not clearly applicable to the facts of
this case. Here, Reedy Creek is not navigable in fact, as it has
never been used as waterborne transportation and it could not be
used so without modification, as noted by the lower court. The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (“[Waters] are navigable in
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.”). Still, Bonhomme and Progress
may be able to argue that Ditch C-1 is a water of the U.S.
regardless of whether Reedy Creek is navigable in fact. See Envtl.
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 823 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (holding that in order to find that streams are waters
of the U.S., plaintiff needed to demonstrate a significant nexus
between intermittent streams and creek which was a water of the
U.S., without the court finding that the creek was navigable in
fact.).
Second, Maleau may argue that the “significant nexus” test
only applies to wetlands and thus does not apply to Ditch C-1. See
S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a court cannot use the “significant nexus” test
to evaluate the navigability of non-wetlands); see also Benjamin
v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Or.
2009). However, Bonhomme and Progress will point out that
other courts have also examined whether the “significant nexus”
test applies to tributaries and have concluded that the test does
apply. See Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1222-23; Pac. Lumber Co., 469
F. Supp. at 823; United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
1171 (D. Idaho 2011).
B. “RELATIVELY PERMANENT WATERS” TEST
Whether or not the significant nexus test applies,
Bonhomme and Progress may still argue that Ditch C-1 is a
water of the U.S. even under the Rapanos plurality’s “relatively
permanent waters” test. Under this test, only waters that are
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“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water” can be classified as waters of the U.S. Id. at 733. The test
thus excludes “channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically
provide drainage for rainfall.” Id. at 739. However, Bonhomme
and Progress will point out that the plurality noted that this test
does not “necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might
dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought.” Id. at
732 n. 5. Since Ditch C-1’s flow is more than intermittent since it
contains flowing water for up to eleven months out of the year at
the maximum and nine months at minimum. Vierstra, 803 F.
Supp. 2d at 1168, aff’d 492 Fed. Appx. 738 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that a canal that only held water for six to eight months
a year was a water of the U.S. since it met both the “relatively
permanent” and “significant nexus” standards). Additionally
regardless of the period of flow, Ditch C-1 flows only with the
exception of periods of drought. Thus under the plurality’s
“relatively permanent waters” test, the Ditch’s lack of water
during drought does not preclude it from being a water of the U.S.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732 n.5.
Moreover, Bonhomme and Progress can argue that the
Twelfth Circuit should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Rapanos that a “seasonally intermittent stream which ultimately
empties into a . . . water of the United States can, itself, be a
water of the United States.” United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984,
989 (9th Cir. 2007). Under this interpretation, Ditch C-1 would
clearly be included in the waters of the U.S. Maleau, however,
can distinguish Moses from the case at bar as the water in
question here is not a natural stream but a manmade ditch
created for drainage.
Maleau will argue that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S.
under the “relatively permanent waters” test. The plurality
excluded “ditches, channels, and conduits” from its “relatively
permanent waters” on the basis that they could not be at once
both listed a point source and included in the definition of
navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737. While Maleau
should address the dissent’s and Justice Kennedy’s argument
that excluding ditches from the definition of waters of the U.S. is
a matter of semantics, ultimately he can contend that the
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distinction stands. He can argue that while there are times when
a “ditch” can be a “stream,” this is not one of them. When a ditch
does not permanently hold water, like Ditch C-1, it should not be
classified as a stream or as a water of the U.S. Id. at 736 n.7.
Additionally, Maleau can argue that even if the “relatively
permanent waters” test could include ditches that did not contain
a permanent flow, the fact that Ditch C-1 dries up for up to three
months every year makes the water flow intermittent. However,
Bonhomme and Progress should note that this argument is
relatively weak. Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide
how many moths per year water must flow in order for the water
to be “relatively permanent,” lower courts have generally found
that anywhere from 3-6 months is an acceptable minimum. See
Deerfield Plantation Phase II-B Prop. Owners Ass’n v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 501 Fed. Appx. 268, 271 (4th Cir. 2012) (3
months); Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (6-8 months).
VIII. VIOLATION—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR
IN HOLDING THAT BONHOMME IS IN
VIOLATION OF § 301(A) OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT?
Section 301(a) of the CWA states that “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” subject to enumerated
exceptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Bonhomme argues that he does
not violate the CWA because Maleau indirectly adds arsenic to
the Ditch via his waste piles. Maleau and Progress argue that
Bonhomme is liable regardless of who added the arsenic because
Bonhomme owns the culvert/point source discharging the
pollutant into Reedy Creek.
Bonhomme may argue that he does not violate the CWA
because Ditch C-1 is a jurisdictional water of the U.S., and
therefore the point source discharge to waters of the U.S. occurs
on Maleau’s property. (The navigability of the Ditch and the
Creek is discussed supra at 16 and 14 respectively.) Under CWA
§ 502(12), a discharge occurs only when a pollutant is added to
waters of the U.S. from a point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). EPA
interprets the term addition to mean the physical addition of a
pollutant to the water from the outside world and this
interpretation has been upheld in various circumstances. See
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Nat’l Wildlfe Found. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that NPDES permitting
should apply to dams because under EPA’s interpretation of
“addition” dams do not add pollutants to water); Nat’l Wildlife
Found. v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 862 F.2d 580, 584
(6th Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA’s determination that turbines
releasing water contaminated by entrained fish were not subject
to NPDES permitting because the pollutants were already in the
water); see also L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2013) (holding that no addition
occurs when water flows between two parts of the same water
body) (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95,
109-12 (2004)). Thus, Bonhomme will argue that Ditch C-1’s
release of arsenic, which is already present in its water, into
Reedy Creek cannot be an addition under EPA’s interpretation.
Since Maleau has already added the arsenic to Ditch C-1,
Bonhomme is not discharging a pollutant and cannot be in
violation of CWA § 301. However, Maleau and Progress will
respond that Ditch C-1 is not a jurisdictional water of the U.S.
and thus Bonhomme is liable for the discharge of arsenic into
Reedy Creek since the discharge occurs on Bonhomme’s land.
Bonhomme will reply that even if NPDES permitting
applies to the discharge from Ditch C-1—meaning that Ditch C-1
is not a water of the U.S.—into Reedy Creek, he is still not liable
for the CWA violation as Maleau is the but-for cause of the
addition of arsenic into the Creek. In Rapanos, the plurality
noted in dicta that “[t]he [CWA] does not forbid the ‘addition of
any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’
but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’”
547 U.S. at 743 (emphasis in original). The plurality concluded
that it is likely a violation of the CWA to discharge pollutants
into a conveyance that would naturally wash downstream into a
navigable water. Id.
Moreover, lower courts have rejected the idea that a
pollutant must be discharged directly into a navigable water for a
violation of the CWA to occur. In United States v. Velsicol
Chemical Corporation, the defendant discharged pollutants into
the city sewer system that ultimately discharged into the
Mississippi River. 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
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The court found that although the defendant was not discharging
directly into the Mississippi, “[t]he fact that defendant may
discharge through conveyances owned by another party does not
remove defendant’s actions from the scope of this Act.” Id. at 947.
In Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., the court found that
the defendant’s discharge of pollutants from mining waste piles
into a mineshaft that then discharged into a navigable water
violated the CWA. 421 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir. 2005). Much
like in Velsicol and El Paso Gold Mines, Maleau is discharging
pollutants from his waste piles into a conveyance that flows into a
water of the U.S. Since Bonhomme can argue that a discharge of
pollutants into a conveyance that naturally wash downstream is
a violation of the CWA, he can argue that it is Maleau who is in
violation by discharging pollutants into the Ditch that then
naturally wash down stream into the Creek.
Maleau and Progress have several ways of attacking the
argument that Maleau is liable for a discharge that naturally
washes downstream to water of the U.S. since he is the but-for
cause of the discharge. First, Maleau and Progress can discount
both Rapanos’ and Velsicol’s application to this case. The
plurality in Rapanos did not decide the issue of discharges into a
conveyance that wash downstream to a water of the United
States, and thus the language relating to such discharges
contained therein is dicta and is not binding precedent. 547 U.S.
at 743. Further, Maleau and Progress can argue that the
discharge at issue here is distinguishable from that of Velsicol. In
Velsicol, the defendant was discharging not into a privately
owned ditch but into a publicly owned treatment works. 438 F.
Supp. at 946-47.
Second, Maleau and Progress can make the argument that
discharge and addition are not defined in terms of causation. In
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the CWA “bans the discharge of any
pollutant by any person regardless of whether that person was
the root cause or merely the current superintendent of the
discharge.” 625 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2010). Although West
Virginia Highlands involved the liability of the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection for discharges from an
inactive mine that it owned but had never operated or caused
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discharges from the mine, the underlying reasoning that
ownership, not causation, is the inquiry for determining liability
still applies.
El Paso Gold Mines also stands for the proposition that
liability is predicated on ownership, not causation. In that case
the defendant was held liable for a violation of the CWA not only
because he discharged pollutants into mineshaft that led to a
water of the United States, but also because he owned the
mineshaft. 421 F.3d at 1137 (“[T]he key to liability under the
CWA is the ownership . . . of a point source which ‘adds’
pollutants to navigable waters, and liability therefore attaches
not on the activity which results in the point source discharge,
but rather on the point source discharge itself.”) (quoting Sierra
Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Civ. No. 01-PC-2163 (OES), slip op.
at 23-24 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002)).
Maleau and Progress can argue that these cases
demonstrate that liability for a discharge is determined by
ownership, not causation. Here, Maleau’s waste piles discharge
into the Ditch, but Bonhomme owns the culvert through which it
discharges into Reedy Creek. Maleau and Progress can argue
that Maleau is not liable for the violation since liability under the
CWA does not contemplate who causes the discharge, but simply
who owns the point source. Thus, Bonhomme, as owner of the
conveyance, is liable for the violation of the CWA.
However, Bonhomme may point out that in both West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy and El Paso Goldmines, the
owner of the point source was also the owner of the initial
discharge. Bonhomme may be able to distinguish these cases
from the situation here since Maleau owns the property where
the waste piles are discharging arsenic. Thus, Bonhomme could
argue that this case requires a different result.
Maleau and Progress can further bolster the argument
that Bonhomme is liable for the violation by virtue of his
ownership of the Ditch by extending the logic from Miccosukee.
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court held that “[the] definition [of
point source] includes within its reach point sources that do not
themselves generate pollutants.” 541 U.S. at 105. Maleau and
Progress can argue that this again shows that the § 301(a) of the
CWA is not interested in the cause of addition but rather with
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where the discharge to a water of the United States occurs. Since
Bonhomme owns the culvert and since the culvert, although it
does not generate a pollutant, is a point source, he is liable for the
discharges under the CWA.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed
in teams’ written submissions and oral arguments. One
should appreciate reasoned and reasonable creativity and
ideas beyond those in this limited analysis.
[See pages 42-44 for issue tables and sample judges’
questions.]
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Issue Table 1
Summary of Parties’ Positions by Issue
District
Progress
Maleau
Bonhomme
Court
Is
Bonhomme
the real
party in
interest
under
FRCP 17(a)?
Is
Bonhomme
a “citizen”
as defined
by the
CWA?
Are
Maleau’s
waste piles
are point
sources?
Is Ditch C-1
a water of
the United
States?
Is Reedy
Creek a
water of the
United
States?
Does
Bonhomme
violate the
CWA as
owner of
the culvert?
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No.

No.

No.

Yes.

No.

No.

No.

Yes.

No.

No.

No.

Yes.

No.

Yes.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

No.
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Issue Table 2
Summary of Parties’ Procedural Postures by Issue
Bonhomme
District
Progress
Maleau
Bonhomme
Complaint
Court
Posture on Posture on Posture on
Holding
Appeal
Appeal
Appeal
Bonhomme
No.
(Agrees)
(Agrees)
Appeals
is the real
Bonhomme
party in
is not the
interest
real party
under
in interest.
FRCP
17(a).
Bonhomme
No.
(Agrees)
(Agrees)
Appeals
is a
Bonhomme
“citizen”
is not a
as defined
“citizen.”
by the
CWA.
Maleau’s
No.
(Agrees)
(Agrees)
Appeals
waste piles
Maleau’s
are point
piles are
sources.
not point
sources.
Ditch C-1
No. Ditch
Appeals
(Agrees)
Appeals
is a water
C-1 is not a
of the
water of
United
the United
States.
States.
Reedy
Yes. Reedy
(Agrees)
Appeals
(Agrees)
Creek is a
Creek is a
water of
water of
the United
the United
States.
States.
Bonhomme
Yes.
(Agrees)
(Agrees)
Appeals
violates
Bonhomme
the CWA
violates
as owner
the CWA.
of the
culvert.
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SAMPLE QUESTIONS
These questions are developed as a starting point. Please
feel free to develop your own.
Issue 1 (FRCP 17) Questions




Maleau and Progress
o Why does Bonhomme’s association with PMI
automatically mean that he is not the real party in
interest? Why can’t two parties be real parties in
interest?
o Does Bonhomme really have nothing to gain or lose
from this action? Does the fact that Bonhomme
may have a noneconomic stake in the ecological
health of the Marsh change the answer to that
question?
Bonhomme
o If PMI also has an interest in this action, why
shouldn’t PMI be the real party in interest under
FRCP 17(a)?
o Does it make sense that standing should grant a
party status as the real party in interest?
 Could there be a situation where a plaintiff
has standing but is still not a real party in
interest?

Issue 2 (“Citizen” under CWA § 505) Questions


Maleau and Progress
o Doesn’t the fact that “citizen” is further defined as
a person or entity indicate that Congress did not
intend for “citizen” to be narrowly read so as to
actually require US citizenship to bring a CWA
citizen suit?
o If the purpose of the CWA citizen suit provision is
to improve the enforcement of the CWA, wouldn’t
requiring US citizenship frustrate that purpose?

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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Bonhomme
o Does it matter whether a state, municipality, or
corporation is domestic and not foreign when suing
under CWA § 505?
o Wouldn’t allowing a foreign national to bring a suit
under CWA § 505 as a “citizen” completely write
out the word citizen from § 505?
o Wouldn’t allowing foreign individuals or companies
to sue under CWA § 505 be bad public policy since
the US would be allowing foreign companies to sue
and possibly damage US corporations?

Issue 3 (Point Source) Questions




Maleau and Progress
o How are Maleau’s waste piles in this case any
different than those of the defendants in Abston?
 If there is no factual difference then why
shouldn’t this court adopt the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning that waste piles that cause water
to create ditches and gullies running to a
stream are point sources?
o Even if a pile itself is not a “discernable, confined,
and discrete conveyance,” aren’t the channels
running from the piles “discernable, confined, and
discrete conveyance[s]?”
o Channels are included in the definition of point
source. Why shouldn’t the channels in this case be
classified as a point source?
o Even if Ditch C-1 is not navigable, aren’t Maleau’s
waste piles still point sources?
Bonhomme
o If this court finds that Ditch C-1 is not a water of
the U.S. can Maleau’s waste piles still be point
sources under the CWA?
o Does Abston still apply to Maleau’s waste piles if
this court finds that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the
U.S.?
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Issue 4 (Navigability—Reedy Creek) Questions




Maleau
o 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 includes interstate waters in the
definition of waters of the U.S. without
qualification. Why should the requirement that an
interstate water significantly affect interstate
commerce be read into the definition?
o Couldn’t the court view Reedy Creek’s water, which
is used as irrigation for interstate agriculture, as a
commodity and thus an instrumentality of
commerce? Would that then make Reedy Creek
regulable under the CWA?
Bonhomme and Progress
o How is Wildman Marsh, an intrastate wetland, a
water of the U.S. under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2?
 Does it even matter that most of the Marsh
is on federal land under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2?
o Does SWANCC rule out the argument that:
 Wildman Marsh is a water of the U.S. due to
its use by interstate duck hunters? or
 Reedy Creek’s is a water of the U.S. due to
its use as irrigation in interstate
agriculture?

Issue 5 (Navigability—Ditch C-1) Questions


Maleau
o Although the plurality in Rapanos said that a point
source cannot also be a navigable water, what is
the real difference between a ditch that contains a
relatively permanent flow of water and a stream?
o Why shouldn’t this court adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning that a tributary to a seasonally
intermittent stream is a water of the United
States?
o Does the fact that Ditch C-1 runs dry only up to 3
months of the year actually make it an intermittent
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stream under the plurality’s “relatively permanent
waters” test?
o Should both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s
tests apply?
o What result does Marks mandate? Does Marks
even apply in this case?
Bonhomme and Progress
o Can Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test
apply to the facts of this case since Reedy Creek in
not navigable in-fact?
o Why should Ditch C-1 be a water of the United
States when under Rapanos those conveyances
listed as point sources cannot simultaneously be
waters of the United States?
o Should both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s
tests apply?
 What result does Marks mandate? Does
Marks relevant here?
 (Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)
stands for the proposition that concurrence
on the narrowest ground should be
considered the holding of the case.)

Issue 6 (Violation of CWA 301) Questions


Maleau and Progress
o How do you respond to the plurality in Rapanos
who concluded that it is likely that a person who
discharges into a conveyance that then washes
downstream to a water of the U.S. is in violation of
the CWA?
o Can the cases supporting the proposition that
ownership of a point source is the ultimate
determination of liability for a CWA violation be
differentiated from the case at bar since Bonhomme
only owns the culvert and not the original point of
discharge?
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Bonhomme
o Assuming that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S.,
doesn’t Miccosukee suggest that Bonhomme is
liable as the owner of a point source regardless of
whether the point source he owns generated the
pollutant?
o Is Velsicol distinguishable from this case since the
defendant in Velsicol was discharging into a
publicly owned treatment works?
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